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This paper questions the claim that the European Parliament (EP) is a legislature with strong 
committees.  It  examines  to  what  extent  the  plenary  adopts  committee  reports  as  the  official 
parliamentary legislative positions under codecision. The committees’ impact is expected to be 
substantially  weakened  when  an  informal  early  agreement  is  reached  with  the  Council. 
Furthermore, following the predictions of congressional theories, committees are expected to be 
more successful if the legislators drafting their reports have no special outlying interests, have 
relevant expertise, and are affiliated with big party groups. These hypotheses are tested on an 
original data set on all codecision reports which passed first reading in the 6th EP so far (2004-
2009). The findings suggests that indeed informal trilogue agreements significantly undermine 
committees’  legislative  influence,  which  is  somewhat  counteracted  by  the  expertise  of 
rapporteurs.  
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Introduction 
For over a decade the European Parliament has served as an equal co-legislator with the Council 
of Ministers in drafting the European legislation falling under the codecision procedure. The 
latter procedure has significantly changed since it was first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992).  Most  importantly,  the  Amsterdam  Treaty  (1999)  abolished  the  Council’s  ability  to 
reinstate its position after three readings of unsuccessful negotiations with the EP and allowed 
for an early conclusion of codecision acts already in the first reading. This option of ‘fast track 
legislation’ has had profound impact not only on the legislative process, but also on the internal 
dynamics of decision-making in the Parliament. Traditionally, the EP  committees have been 
widely acknowledged as the main arenas for in-depth deliberation on legislative proposals and 
drafting of the parliamentary legislative positions, which are then largely adopted by the plenary. 
However, it has become increasingly common to negotiate the parliamentary stances in informal 
trilogue meetings with the Council and the Commission, often without a clear mandate from the 
committees. While these meetings have inevitably increased the power of the present actors 
negotiating on behalf of the EP (mainly the legislators assigned to draft the EP report, i.e. the 
rapporteurs), it is claimed here that they have largely undermined the role of the parliamentary 
committees.  
To examine this proposition, this paper first compares the extent to which the EP draws its 
opinions on the basis of the committees’ reports when an early agreement is reached with the 
Council  and  when  it  is  not.  The  results  show  that  indeed  committees  are  more  successful 
whenever there was no early agreement.  As a second step, attempts are made to explain beyond 
trilogue agreements the  variation in the degree  to which the plenary adopts the committees’ 
proposals depending on the properties of the reports, their subject areas, and the characteristics of 
the rapporteurs. Following the logic of the distributive (Shepsle, 1978), informational (Krehbiel, 
1991)  and  partisan  (Cox  and  McCubbins,  1993)  congressional  theories  of  legislative 
organization, it can be expected that a larger proportion of the committee reports will be adopted 
in plenary if the rapporteur has not special outlying interests, has expertise in the subject area, 
and is a member of a big party group. Evidence is found only for the informational theory, i.e. 
committee reports drafted by experts are more successful in the plenary.  
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To test the hypotheses, an original data set has been compiled on all the substantive legislative 
reports falling under the codecision procedure, which have had their first reading during the 6
th 
EP (2004-2009).
1 Monte Carlo simulations are used in comparing the mean legislative impact of 
committees when there was an early agreement to when there was none. Variation in the plenary 
adoption  of  individual  committee  reports  is  analysed  via  OLS  regression  and  poisson  count 
models.  
This paper proceeds as follows. After a brief overview of the state of the art on the topic below, 
the average success rate of committees is analysed. Following that the hypotheses regarding the 
level of success of individual reports in plenary are developed, the measures and methods are 
presented and the results are discussed. Finally, the legislative role of the EP committees is re-
evaluated in light of the findings.  
Role of EP committees under codecision. Early agreement. 
A substantial part of the EP’s legislative tasks are performed by its committees (Collins et al., 
1998: 6). They allow for specialization and information accumulation (Mamadouh and Raunio, 
2003; Raunio, 1997), and serve as an important arena for majority formation (Neuhold, 2001). 
Although  they  have  no  agenda-setting  powers  in  the  broad  sense  and  examine  questions 
proposed by the Commission, most of the parliamentary powers of delay and amendment are 
exercised  there  (Corbett  et  al.,  2005).  Thus,  it is  commonly  accepted  that  after  a  legislative 
proposal has been made by the Commission, it is in the EP committees where the ‘[p]arliament’s 
positions  are  in  most  cases  decided  in  practice’,  before  the  plenary  stage  (Mamadouh  and 
Raunio, 2003: 348; see also Bowler and Farrell, 1995; McElroy, 2001; Neuhold, 2001; Kreppel, 
2002a; Hix et al., 2003). It has been further claimed that it is uncommon for committee proposals 
to be heavily modified or rejected in plenary (Bowler and Farrell, 1995: 234).  
However, the role of the EP legislative committees and their relation to the plenary have often 
been  discussed  in  isolation  from  the  inter-institutional  context.  Alternatively,  the  legislative 
impact of the Parliament vis-a-vis the Council has been analysed under the assumption that it is a 
                                                 
1 Currently, the data set represents the situation as of 14 March 2009. The last plenary session of the 6
th EP will take 
place on 7 May 2009 when the data set will be updated.    
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unitary actor (Kreppel, 1999, 2002b; Tsebelis et al., 2001). Since under the codecision procedure 
the EP acts as a co-legislator with the Council of Minister in what appears to be a bicameral 
European legislature, its internal dynamics can hardly be expected to remain unaffected by the 
extra-parliamentary setting and the opportunities and constraints it offers to parliamentary actors 
or groups of actors. This has become increasingly so in recent years with the growing number of 
legislative proposals being practically decided upon in informal trilogue meetings between the 
EP, the Council and the Commission, happening in closed doors outside the traditional decision-
making arenas.
2 While originally convened to make preparations for upcoming negotiations in 
the Conciliation Committee (Garman and Louise Hilditch, 1998), trilogue meeting have become 
a  common  decision-making  mode  in  the  early  stages  of  the  codecision  procedure  after  the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1999) made that possible. Statistics show that during the 5
th EP (1999-2004) 
28% of codecision acts were concluded in the first reading (EP, 2004). This number grew to 60% 
in the first half of the 6
th EP (2004-2007) (EP, 2007a).  
On the one hand, these developments have been interpreted positively since trilogue meetings 
have  increased  the  communication  and  coordination  between  the  EP  and  the  Council,  thus 
speeding up the legislative process. Arguably, it has also enhanced the legislative influence of 
the Parliament. The Parliament is better able to affect the common position the Council adopts 
through its prior negotiations with the Council Presidency (Farrell and Héritier, 2007: 98). On 
the  other  hand,  however,  this  increase  in  efficiency  has  been  accompanied  by  lack  of 
transparency and shift of the decision-making process away from the traditional parliamentary 
arenas of democratic debate and deliberation. The EP has made some efforts in counteracting 
that  by  signing  a  joint  declaration  with  the  Commission  and  the  Council  (EP  et  al.,  2007). 
Among others, it encourages the Council Presidency to attend committee meetings and, where 
not  bounded  by  confidentiality,  to  provide  information  regarding  the  Council’s  position. 
Furthermore, it invites the chair of COREPER to send a letter to the parliamentary committee 
chair whenever an informal agreement was reached in the trilogue meetings, whereby expressing 
                                                 
2 ‘These trilogues involve the president of COREPER (which rotates with the presidency) and the chairman of the 
relevant working group on the Council’s side. On the Parliament’s side, they involve the rapporteur, the committee 
chairman, one of the vice presidents of the Parliament, and the shadow rapporteurs or coordinators from the various 
political groups’ (Farrell and Héritier, 2004: 1197) For more detailed information on informal early agreements see 
Farrell and Héritier (2004).  
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the Council’s intention to support the EP position if the agreement is adopted in plenary. Despite 
this  initiative,  the  development  of  information  asymmetry  between  the  parliamentary 
representatives present in the trilogue meetings (usually the rapporteur, shadow rapporteurs, and 
the committee chair) and the other Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) regarding the 
content of legislative acts and the position of the Council is inevitable. Negotiations with Council 
are often initiated by the rapporteur without a clear committee mandate, i.e. before the committee 
has even voted its draft position (Farrell and Héritier, 2004).  In some  cases the reports that 
rapporteurs suggest to their committees are de facto composed solely of amendments already 
agreed upon with the Council, thus rendering both committee and plenary negotiations virtually 
obsolete.  Although  in  such  cases  the  committees  might  have  played  a  role  in  shaping  the 
substance  of  the  agreed  upon  text,  the  extent  of  this  influence  is  impossible  to  objectively 
quantify. It is, however, reasonable to assume that whenever a committee position is virtually 
drafted and agreed upon outside the committee meetings with no prior mandate, the legislative 
power  of  the  committees  is  weakened.  A  different  scenario  involves  the  cases  in  which  an 
informal agreement is reached only after the committee has taken its final vote but before the 
plenary  stage.  In  such  case,  it  is  hypothesized  here  that  plenary  would  largely  by-pass  the 
committee’s opinion and simply adopt the early inter-institutional agreement despite the non-
binding character of the latter, which is possible due to the open amendment rule in committee 
and  plenary.
3  It  has  been  suggested  that  when  an  informal  trilogue  ‘works  successfully,  the 
Parliament and Council do little more than sign off on an early-agreement deal that has already 
been negotiated among a small group of actors’ (Farrell and Héritier, 2007: 99). To what extent 
this is indeed the case is an empirical question, which deserved closer attention.  
 
Hypothesis 1. The EP committees are less successful in having the plenary adopt their draft 
reports when an informal agreement is reached with the Council after the committee stage 
 
                                                 
3 ‘Amendments for consideration in Parliament may be tabled by the committee responsible, a political group or at 
least 37 Members’ (Rule 150 in EP, 2007b).  
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In order to examine this hypothesis, the average success of reports in the plenary is examined per 
committee both when there was an early agreement after the committee stage and when there 
was  none.  For  the  purpose,  an  original  data  set  has  been  compiled,  which  includes  all  the 
substantive  legislative  reports  falling  under  the  codecision  procedure,  which  had  their  first 
reading in committee and plenary during the 6
th EP (2004-2009) (more on the sample in the 
research design section). Since nine of the twenty EP standing committees produced 90% of the 
substantive codecision acts in the period and no other committee drafted more than 5 reports, 
only those nine are examined below. To extract information on the existence and type early 
agreement,  the  committee  reports,  plenary  debates  and  proposed  party  groups’  and  MEPs’ 
amendments have been examined. These are available on web site of the Legislative Observatory 
of the European Parliament. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 displays how many reports a committee drafted, further sorted by early agreement and 
the stage at which the early agreement was reached, i.e. before or after the committee took its 
final vote. The latter distinction is an important one, since most often an agreement before the 
committee vote is associated with 100% adoption of the committee report in plenary (since it is 
de facto the early agreement text), and an agreement after the committee vote – with a lapse of 
most amendments proposed by the committee. The last three columns are the ones of interest 
here in testing Hypothesis 1. They represent the mean proportion of adopted EP amendments 
proposed by the committee, i.e. adopted committee amendments over total number of adopted 
amendments in the plenary. This is a measure of the mean success rate of committees in drafting 
the  final  parliamentary  opinions.  The  means  have  been  calculated  for  1)  all  substantive 
codecision reports drafted by a committee; 2) only the committee reports which underwent an 
early agreement with the Council after the committee stage; and 3) only the committee reports 
which were not subject to any sort of an early agreement.  
Due  to  the  limited  number  of  reports  in  each  category,  Monte  Carlo  simulations  have  been 
conducted to establish whether these means could have occurred by chance. For the purpose, for  
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each category 10,000 combinations of reports of N equal to that of the number of actual reports 
in the respective category have been drawn without replacement from the pool of the overall 
sample of reports in the EP. A mean is considered statistically significant if more than 95% (one-
tailed) of the means of the generated groups within the respective category were less extreme 
than it. Thus, there is a 5% chance that observed committee mean has occurred by chance.  
The  results  provide  strong  evidence  in  favour  of  Hypothesis  1.  The  mean  success  rate  of 
committee reports in plenary is substantially lower when an early agreement after the committee 
stage is reached than when it is not, and most of these means have not occurred by chance. While 
the  committee  reports  tend  to  be  adopted  in  their  entirely  if  an  informal  agreement  was 
concluded before the committee stage (not in table), these reports are in reality not the product of 
the committee and, hence, cannot be considered as committee success. Thus, indeed the EP 
committees are most successful in influencing the EP position when no informal agreements are 
made, which used to be the status quo before the option of ‘fast track legislation’ was introduced 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam. For the cases with no early agreement, the mean proportion of 
adopted  plenary  amendments  drafted  by  a  committee  appears  to  be  over  90%  for  most 
committees (see last column), suggesting that to a large extent the committees draft their reports 
in anticipation of the plenary reaction. Thus, although the data examined here is not longitudinal, 
it hints that the EP committees have lost legislative power due to initiation of the practice of 
informal negotiations with the Council.  
Table  1  portrays  also  significant  differences  among  committees  in  the  extent  to  which  they 
manage to influence the parliamentary legislative positions. This curious observation combined 
with the interest in explaining variation in the level of adoption of individual reports by the 
plenary calls for a shift from aggregate to individual level analysis. 
Explaining the variation in the success of reports in the plenary 
In the concluding remarks of their study, evaluating when the EP is successful in getting its 
amendments accepted by the Council, Tsebelis et al (2001: 599) admit that future research on the 
policy influence of the EP will have to take into account other variables ‘like policy area of 
legislation, size of bills, density of amendments, political affiliation of rapporteurs of a bill’, 
which,  they  claim,  would  involve  a  shift  in  studies  from  amendments  to  legislative  acts.  In  
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contrast to research on the influence of the EP prevalent in the 1990s which assumed it to be a 
unitary actor (e.g. Tsebelis, 1994; König and Pöter, 2001; Moser, 1996), focus in recent research 
has been shifted towards examining the internal parliamentary organization and dynamics. Thus, 
numerous studies have been devoted to examining committee composition (Bowler and Farrell, 
1995; Whitaker, 2001; McElroy, 2006; Rasmussen, 2008; Yordanova, 2009), the allocation of 
reports  (Hausemer,  2006;  Hoyland,  2006;  Kaeding,  2004,  2005),  party  groups’  politics  and 
voting  (Hix  et  al.,  2007;  Kreppel,  2002a),  etc.  However,  rarely  are  the  intra-parliamentary 
structures analysed in conjunction with the inter-institutional context. The question posed here – 
when does the plenary adopt the committee reports as its official positions – inevitably calls for 
the combination of both intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary explanatory factors.  
It was already established above that the committees are more successful in having their reports 
adopted by the plenary when no informal agreement is reached between the EP and the Council. 
The hypotheses formulated here, therefore, turn to explaining how report-specific factors affect a 
report’s fortune in plenary. More specifically, since the rapporteur is the one responsible for 
drafting  the  committee  reports,  negotiating  with  the  Council,  gathering  majority  support, 
presenting  the  draft  report  to  the  plenary,  and  following  the  development  of  the  enacted 
legislative act all the way until its successful implementation (under the new procedure with 
scrutiny), the impact of his or her characteristics is the focus of attention. Due to their strong 
agenda-setting powers, the rapporteurs can have a substantial impact on the fortune of committee 
draft reports. Previous research has shown that the rapporteurs have gained in power vis-à-vis 
their committee colleagues due to the new practice of informal decision-making with the Council 
(Farrell and Héritier, 2004). Although they are expected to represent and seek the support of the 
majority of members in their committee rather than seeking to further their own policy interests 
this is not necessarily so. 
Studies  on  report  allocation  have  shown  that,  for  instance,  rapporteurs  in  the Committee  on 
Environment, Public Health and Safety tend to be homogenous high demanders due to their 
interest group affiliations (Kaeding, 2004, 2005). While this does not necessarily mean that such 
rapporteurs  would  be  proposing  outlying  draft  reports,  such  an  option  cannot  be  excluded. 
Furthermore,  while  the  EP  committees  have  been  shown  to  be  largely  representative  of  the 
plenary  in  terms  of  party  group  composition,  the  literature  is  divided  with  respect  to  how  
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representative they are in terms of the policy preferences of their members. While McElroy 
(2006) argues that committees reflect the ideological composition of the plenary, other research 
shows  that    occupational  and  interest  group  attachments  are  the  only  statistically  significant 
determinants of committee membership  (Bowler and Farrell, 1995) and some committees with 
targeted distributive output tend to attract MEPs with relevant interests group ties (Yordanova, 
2009). Thus, an outlying proposal in a committee composed of outliers may be in line with the 
interests  of  the  majority  in  the  committee,  but  not  with  the  majority  in  the  plenary.  The 
distributive congressional theory (Shepsle, 1978) provides an explanation for such a situation. It 
suggests that committees would tend to be staffed with homogeneous preference-outliers who 
serve the special interests of their constituencies. As a consequence, the policies they propose 
would  be  outlying  and  subtotal  for  the  overall  chamber.  If  that  is  the  case  in  the  European 
Parliament, given the lack of any EP restrictive rules safeguarding the committee proposals from 
amendments in plenary, it could be expected that outlying committee reports will be largely 
discarded  on  the  floor.  Since  MEPs  with  special  interest  are  more  likely  to  have  outlying 
preferences, the expectation is that: 
 
Hypothesis 2. A committee report is less successful in plenary if it is drafted by a rapporteur with 
relevant special interests  
 
Research on committee’s composition and committee assignments has shown that MEPs with 
expertise tend to be assigned to their respective committees (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; McElroy, 
2006; Yordanova, 2009). Furthermore, according to the informational theory (Krehbiel, 1991) 
the purpose of the legislative committees is to serve the informational needs of the plenary in a 
setting  without  a  majority  party,  characterised  by  uncertainty  about  the  link  between  policy 
output  and    policy  outcome.  If  indeed  EP  committees  serve  the  informational  needs  of  the 
plenary, it is reasonable to expect that the relevant expertise of committee members would be 
utilized in drafting reports. Consequently, the plenary is less likely to amend a well-informed 
legislative report serving its informational needs. This leads to the following expectations.  
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Hypothesis 3. A committee report is more successful in plenary if it is drafted by a rapporteur 
with relevant expertise  
 
Finally, the partisan theory (Cox and McCubbins, 1993) states that the committees serve the 
interests of the majority party to control its members via the assignment of office and resources 
and, thus, to enhance party cohesion Since there is no majority party or majority party group in 
the European Parliament, analogically the party groups most often needed to form the necessary 
parliamentary majorities in passing legislation are expected to dominate the committee work. 
Analogically, they would also dominate the plenary. Hence, if the rapporteur comes from a big 
party group, fewer of the proposed committee amendments would be rejected in plenary. Farrell 
and Héritier (2004: 1200) argue that ‘rapporteurs are particularly powerful, when they are closely 
linked  to  the  large  political  groups’,  while  ‘smaller  political  groups  in  the  Parliament  find 
themselves increasingly excluded from the decision-making’ (2004: 1201). The three biggest 
party groups in the EP currently are the Group of European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) 
and European Democrats (EPP-ED) with 268 members (288 post 2007 enlargement), Socialist 
Group in the European Parliament (PSE) with 200 members (217 post 2007 enlargement), and 
the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) with 88 members (100 
post 2007 enlargement). Although ALDE is substantially smaller, it is included in the hypothesis 
since it serves as a convenient coalition partner and usually sides with one of the two bigger 
party groups in adopting the EP position. Thus:  
 
Hypothesis 4. A committee report is more successful in plenary if it is drafted by a rapporteur 
affiliated with one of the three biggest party groups - EPP-ED, PSE and ALDE 
 
In the case of an early agreement, Farrell and Héritier (2007: 100) have argued that ‘the power of 
the rapporteurs and shadow-rapporteurs of large political groups is greatly increased while the 
chairs of committees and the MEPs from small political groups  suffer from a relative loss of 
influence’. The latter have traditionally used the parliamentary committees as a small arena to 
propose amendments and exert influence on legislation. The bigger party groups, however, being  
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the ones usually leading the informal negotiations and reaching an agreement with the Council, 
tend to marginalise smaller groups from the decision-making.  
Research design 
To test these hypotheses, a data set of all the substantive legislative acts, which underwent first 
reading in committee and plenary in the 6
th EP has been collected. The unit of analysis is an 
individual codecision report. Reports falling under the simplified procedure without amendment 
and  debate  (Rule  131  in  EP,  2007b),  reports  introducing  the  new  regulatory  procedure  with 
scrutiny  to  old  legislation,  and  reports  concerned  only  with  the  nomination  of  new  agency 
directors are not included in the sample. Furthermore, reports on which the respective committee 
proposed no amendments are excluded since it is not possible to measure any committee success 
rate in plenary for those. Finally, as in the aggregate analysis above, only the reports drafted by 
the nine most prolific committees are examined, amounting to a total of about 244 cases.  
Measures 
The dependent variable, representing the extent to which a committee draft report is unsuccessful 
in  plenary,  has  been  operationalised  in  two  ways.  The  first  one  measures  the  proportion  of 
amendments  to  the  Commission  proposal  adopted  in  plenary  not  drafted  by  the  responsible 
committee but by a party group/s and groups of at least 37 MEPs.
4 The second one measures 
more directly the ‘failure’ of the committee draft report by counting the number of committee 
amendments rejected in plenary.  
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, measures of committee specific special interest and expertise of the 
rapporteurs  have  been  constructed  in  accordance  with  the  findings  of  Yordanova  (2009) 
regarding the determinants of committee assignments. Thus, a rapporteur is considered to have 
committee specific special interest if he or she sits on the Environment committee and is linked 
to green groups; sits on the Employment and Social Affairs committee and has trade union ties; 
sits on the Industry committee or the committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and has 
business/industry ties; or sits on the Civil Liberties committees and has ties to social groups 
                                                 
4  Since  the  2007  accession  of  Bulgaria  and  Romania  the  minimum  number  of  MEPs  required  to  propose  an 
amendment in plenary has been raised to 40.  
 
12
dealing with people. While these special interests inevitably imply certain level of expertise, they 
are  also  associated  with  clear  policy  preferences  outlying  in  a  certain  direction  and,  hence, 
deviating from the preferences of the median MEP in the plenary in the respective field. The 
operationalisation of the committee specific expertise derived from educational and professional 
experience rather than interest group ties is constructed in a similar fashion. Thus, a legislator is 
considered an expert in a committee field if he or she: sits of the committee of Environment, 
Public Health and Safety and has been educated in medicine or natural sciences/engineering; sits 
on  the  Industry  committee  and  has  education  in  natural  sciences/engineering;  sits  on  the 
committee of Economic and Monetary Affairs and has educational and professional knowledge 
in economic; sits on the Transport committee and has worked in transport sector; or sits of Legal 
Affairs committee and has legal education.  
Dummy variables for affiliation with the EPP-ED, PSE and ALDE are added to test Hypothesis 
4. Furthermore, it is controlled for the size of the national party delegation of the rapporteur.  
The conditioning variables are two dummies for informal early agreement with the Council – one 
for agreement before the committee stage and one for agreement after the committee stage. This 
distinction  is  necessary  as  the  two  options  can  lead  to  opposite  results  with  respect  to  the 
dependent variable. Including these dummies allows evaluating the unique impact of the other 
potentially influential factors controlling for the impact of early agreements.  
To control for the complexity of the report, a variable presenting the number of committee which 
have been consulted for opinion is used as a proxy. Additionally, the level of committee support 
for a draft report is measured by the proportion of committee member who voted in favour of the 
report in the final committee vote. Since committees are microcosms of the plenary, the outcome 
of committee votes can serve as a predictor of the outcome in plenary. It can also be a signal to 
the plenary regarding the level of controversy of the report. Although Settembri and Neuhold 
(2009) have shown that committees generally work consensually, nevertheless they have found 
variation  across  policy  areas.  Additionally,  in  the  second  model  analysing  the  number  of 
committee amendments rejected in plenary it is controlled for the total number of amendments 
proposed by a committee in its report to account for the level of controversy surrounding the 
specific legislation.  
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Finally, committee dummies are included. Table 1 showed that there are substantive differences 
among committees. The committee dummies are used as an approximation of the policy areas, 
not unlike in Kreppel’s study (1999) on acceptance of the Council EP amendments under the 
cooperation procedure.  
Methods 
The different distributions of the two operationalised dependent variables call for different types 
of analysis. While an OLS regression is used the examine the proportion of adopted plenary 
amendments proposed by a committee, a poisson count model is considered more appropriate in 
examining the number of proposed committee amendments rejected in plenary. Furthermore, 
since reports drafted by one committee are expected to be more alike than reports of different 
committees, robust standard errors clustered by committee are used.  
Results 
The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 2. They provide no evidence for 
Hypothesis 2 regarding the negative impact of rapporteurs’ special interests on the success of 
proposed  committee  amendments  in  plenary.  However,  there  is  evidence  for  Hypothesis  3. 
Fewer  committee  amendments  appear  to  be  rejected  in  plenary  if  rapporteur  has  relevant 
expertise. Finally, evidence for Hypothesis 4 is mixed. Only if the rapporteur is affiliated with 
PSE rather than any small party group are less committee amendments rejected in plenary. This 
could most likely be explained with the fact that rapporteurs from PSE concluded much fewer 
early agreements with the Council after the committee vote than rapporteurs from EPP-ED or 
ALDE, while they concluded most of early agreements before the committee vote.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]   
These effects do not show up when the overall proportion of adopted plenary amendments not 
drafted by the committee is examined. This is likely because many more factors are at play when 
looking  simultaneously  at  the  acceptance  rate  of  committee  amendments  and  amendments 
proposed  by  party  groups  and  groups  of  MEPs.  The  sole  adoption  of  new  non-committee 
amendments drives the proportion of adopted plenary amendments not drafted by the committee 
up even if all the proposed committee amendments are adopted. Contrastingly, looking at the  
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rejection rate of proposed committee amendments is a much more direct measure of committee 
‘failure’.  
The effects of the control variables in the second model work in the expected direction although 
they do not reach statistical significance. When there is high committee support for a report, 
fewer of the proposed committee amendments get rejected in plenary. In contrast, the level of 
complexity of the report, measured in terms of the number of committees consulted for opinion, 
has a positive effect on the number of committee amendments rejected in plenary. The size of the 
national  party  of  the  rapporteur  has  no  statistically  significant  effect,  either.  However,  not 
surprisingly,  there  is  strong  evidence  that  the  more  amendments  a  committee  proposes  to  a 
legislative proposal, the more committee amendments are rejected in plenary.  
The differences between committees in the first model are congruent with the findings of the 
aggregate analysis. In terms of rejection rate of proposed committee amendments in the second 
model,  the  Environment  and  Civil  Liberties  seem  to  be  the  leaders,  accompanied  by  the 
committees on Employment and Social Affairs and the Legal Affairs committee.   
Not surprisingly, the first model shows a strong positive predictor of the proportion of adopted 
plenary  amendments  not  drafted  by  the  responsible  committee  is  the  conclusion  of  an  early 
agreement  with  the  Council  after  the  committee  stage.  Alternatively,  the  second  model 
demonstrates that when an early agreement was reached before the committee stage, fewer of the 
proposed committee reports are rejected. This proves an earlier statement in this paper that a 
committee report is basically identical with the early agreement with the Council if the latter was 
reached before the committee stage.  
Discussion 
While it is generally claimed that the European Parliament (EP) de facto drafts its positions on 
legislative  proposals  already  at  the  committee  stage,  this  paper  has  shown  that  this  is  not 
necessarily the case. The extent to which committees are successful in having the plenary adopt 
their reports as the official parliamentary positions is heavily influenced by ongoing informal 
trilogue negotiations and their progress in reaching informal inter-institutional agreements. In 
fact,  the  EP  committee  are  generally  only  successful  in  drafting  the  adopted  parliamentary 
positions  if  no  early  agreements  are  reached  with  the  Council,  which most  often  render  the  
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committee reports obsolete. These findings put in doubt the general perception that the European 
Parliament  is  a  legislature  with  strong  committees.  At  least,  their  legislative  power  is  not 
unconditional. 
The aggregate analysis of committees’ success in affecting the parliamentary positions showed 
that  when  legislative  acts  are  adopted  in  the  EP  plenary  following  the  traditional  decision-
making  mode,  they  are  largely  based  on  the  committee  reports.  However,  the  proportion  of 
adopted committee amendments of the final number of adopted amendments drops substantially 
if  an  informal  agreement  with  the  Council  is  reached  after  the  committee  stage.  While 
occasionally the Council would agree to adopt some of the proposed committee amendments, it 
is not uncommon to see all the committee amendments being lapsed in plenary and instead an 
alternative set of amendments proposed by a number of party groups being adopted in their 
entirety. Thus, the committees’ legislative impact has significantly declined as a result of the new 
mode of informal decision making.  
Despite gains in efficiency, the new procedure of ‘fast track legislation’ has weakened some 
intra-parliamentary structures and actors, and has led to a decrease of transparency, deterioration 
of  open  democratic  debate  in  committees,  and  severe  information  asymmetry  between 
legislators. The representative role and legitimacy of the democratically elected Parliament is 
threatened by the secretive decision-making, leaving it unclear in view of whose interests the 
parliamentary position is negotiated at trilogue meetings and virtually excluding legislators from 
small party groups from the legislative process. Upon an early agreement, deliberation in plenary 
serves  only  as  means  of  advertising  actors’  positions  to  voters  rather  than  making  any  real 
changes or reaching political consensus. Additionally, the rationale behind bicameralism and 
division of legislative power between the EP and the Council has become unclear. If the EP takes 
its decisions in collusion with the Council before even having adopted its own position, then why 
have a democratically elected Parliament? In summary, as Farrell and Héritier (2007: 103) have 
concluded:  ‘The Parliament, faced with the choice between gaining power in insulated trilogues 
and informal agreements on the one hand and a loss in its function as a democratic arena of 
debate on the other, decided in favour of the first’.   
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Taking early agreements aside, committee reports are better received in the plenary when they 
are drafted by rapporteurs with relevant expertise, while the rapporteurs’ special interests do not 
have  any  significant  impact.  Thus,  in  accordance  with  the  informational  theory,  when  the 
committees  serve  the  informational  needs  of  the  plenary  their  output  is  largely  accepted. 
Additionally, the rapporteurs’s from PSE are more successful in having their amendments not 
rejected in plenary. This, however, is not simply due to the size of their party group (as the same 
does not hold for EPP-ED) but also to the fact that they tend to reach more often an agreement 
with  the  Council  before  the  committee  stage,  and  less  often  thereafter  as  compared  to  the 
rapporteurs from other party groups. 
Future  research  still  needs  to  explain  the  observed  strong  variation  in  legislative  influence 
between  committees.  Why  are  some  committees  better  able  to  have  the  plenary  adopt  their 
reports as the official parliamentary positions than others? Furthermore, it would be interesting to 
compare  the  legislative  influence  of  committees  over  the  plenary  under  the  codecision  and 
consultation procedures. 
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Table 1 Mean proportion of amendments in EP opinion derived from a committee report 
Committee  N 
Early 
agreement 
Agreement before 
comm. vote 
Agreement after 
comm. vote 
Mean for all 
report 
Mean if agreement 
after comm. vote 
Mean if no 
agreement 
ECON  23  17  3  14  0.47*  0.16*  0.89 
          (0.46)  (0.33)  (0.17) 
EMPL  22  14  4  10  0.85*  0.69*  0.98* 
          (0.32)  (0.43)  (0.03) 
ENVI  63  29  1  28  0.49*  0.05*  0.80* 
          (0.43)  (0.11)  (0.25) 
ITRE  24  10  1  9  0.94*  0.89*  0.97* 
          (0.2)  (0.33)  (0.04) 
IMCO  21  15  0  15  0.46*  0.27  0.94 
          (0.48)  (0.43)  (0.06) 
TRAN  41  14  1  13  0.70  0.18*  0.94 
          (0.4)  (0.3)  (0.09) 
CULT  20  11  6  5  0.79  0.29  0.92 
          (0.36)  (0.43)  (0.07) 
JURI  20  12  2  10  0.65  0.36  0.94 
          (0.38)  (0.33)  (0.07) 
LIBE  31  19  14  5  0.92*  0.67*  0.94 
          (0.21)  (0.47)  (0.09) 
EP  265  141  32  109  0.67  0.30  0.91 
          (0.42)  (.40)  (0.16) 
* Significance at 5% one-tailed derived from the distribution of the 10,000 simulated committees’ means by Monte Carlo simulations. Std. Deviation displayed 
in brackets. 
Notes: ECON: Economic and Monetary Affairs; EMPL: Employment and Social Affairs; ENVI: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety; ITRE: Industry, 
Research and Energy; IMCO: Internal Market and Consumer Protection; TRAN: Transport and Tourism; CULT: Culture and Education; JURI: Legal Affairs; 
LIBE: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs;  
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Table 2 OLS: Proportion adopted plenary amendments not drafted by the committee & Poisson: 
Number of rejected 'committee amendments' in plenary 
 
Non-committee over total 
adopted amendments 
Number  of rejected 'comm. 
amendments' in plenary 
Total No. of committees amendments    .009*** 
  (.002) 
Level of committee support  -.203  -3.385 
  (.171)  (2.493) 
Complexity (No. of opinion comms)   .016*  -.048 
(.007)  (.042) 
Special interests of rapporteur  -.001  -.503 
  (.033)  (.460) 
Expertise of rapporteur  .034  -.343*** 
  (.034)  (.092) 
National party size of rapp.  .000  .007 
  (.001)  (.006) 
EPP_ED  -.041  .211 
  (.056)  (.229) 
PSE  -.022  -.626* 
  (.058)  (.338) 
ALDE  -.007  .159 
  (.069)  (.211) 
ECON  .095***  -.262 
  (.019)  (.177) 
EMPL  -.209***  .374*** 
  (.022)  (.180) 
ENVI  .117**  1.283*** 
  (.038)  (.132) 
ITRE  -.298***  -.860*** 
  (.030)  (.099) 
TRAN  .055  .014 
  (.038)  (.163) 
CULT  -.019  .661* 
  (.036)  (.353) 
JURI  -.047  .620** 
  (.029)  (.293) 
LIBE  -.092**  2.230*** 
  (.039)  (.335) 
Early agreement after comm. vote  .612***  -.821 
(.105)  (.902) 
Early agreement before comm. vote  .009  -2.556*** 
  (.034)  (.665) 
Constant  .250  .009*** 
   (.234)  (.002) 
Rsq / Pseudo Rsq  .68  .46 
Log-likelihood    -341.5 
N  244  244 
Standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 